In making and applying law, many agents and institutions aim for some optimal solution, yet end up mired in complexity and inefficiency. Their decision-making processes may therefore be improved by the judicious use of simplifying heuristics. In this report we examine some of the ways that heuristics might be used (and should not be used) in the creation and application of laws and regulations.
INTRODUCTION
The Goddess of Justice is represented in many forms across cultures. In the West she is often modeled after Justitia, 1 the Roman personification of justice, shown blindfolded and carrying the scales of justice. In the main hall of the Japanese Supreme Court, the bodhisattva of mercy, Kannon, is depicted with her eyes open. In an image on the cover of the Yale Journal of Law & Feminism, Justitia takes off her blindfold, ready to comprehend the complexity of information, values, goals, and techniques that faces the law today.
The differences in these depictions reflect the key theme of our discussions: To what extent should Justitia exhaustively search, and to what extent should she purposely ignore information? This tension between the complex balancing of all information, as represented by the scales, and ignoring some information, as suggested by the blindfold, parallels the distinction between the ambition to optimize and the desire to simplify.
Suppose Justitia were to put down her scales, take off her blindfold, and pick up some recent books and articles on decision making (e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 1999) . In an epiphany, Justitia realizes that there might be alternatives to the careful weighing of arguments and evidence that she had been doing for all of her eternal life. She wonders if the selective use of heuristics could provide a faster, simpler, and more reliable way to help contentious human beings approach the divine ideal of justice.
As the Goddess reads on, she thinks about all the domains over which she presides. She sees that heuristics might be helpful not only in the courtroom but in all aspects of lawmaking. In making law, the range of possibilities is often infinite, and figuring out which law or administrative policy is most likely to lead to the best outcome is fraught with difficulty. Yet the stakes can be so high that even a slight improvement in the lawmaking process could yield enormous benefits. The Goddess therefore decides to commission a report on the possibilities for the use of heuristics in lawmaking. This chapter is a very rough draft of such a report.
Our working definition is that a "heuristic" is a simple decision or action procedure that ignores some of the available information. Heuristics can be used consciously or unconsciously. In some natural settings they are created in the twinkling of an eye, but in many political or administrative settings they take the form of simple rules that are created only by lengthy processes of deliberation and research. The crucial feature of a heuristic is that it is easy to use when compared to a direct attempt to select the optimal choice using all available information. While heuristics are well described by other reports in this volume, we do think a further distinction is useful for our project. Specifically, we will distinguish between m-heuristics and l-heuristics. An m-heuristic, or mental heuristic, is a simplified procedure existing as part of the cognitive processes of an individual decision maker. An l-heuristic, or legal heuristic, in contrast, is a simplified procedure that has been encoded into law or the lawmaking process.
In this chapter, we will examine some ways that heuristics are used, might be used, and should not be used in the lawmaking process. Our report grows out of a spirited discussion among a diverse group of scholars-lawyers and psychologists, German and American. We believe our differing perspectives helped us to think broadly about our topic. We begin descriptively by exploring the ways that the human mind might be structured or prepared to use heuristics in general and certain m-heuristics in particular. We next look at the lawmaking process: which are the arenas and actors entrusted with making new law, what are the steps in the process, and which of these steps seem most amenable to the use of heuristics? In the third section we examine a particular context-Roman law-in which l-heuristics appear at an early stage in Western legal history to have been quite effective in resolving private disputes between two, or very few, individuals. We next take a more normative perspective and consider when heuristics should and should not be used, especially as we move to more modern contexts. In the section on WHAT ARE NORMATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF HEURISTICS IN LAWMAKING?, we consider some legal, moral, and practical concerns that might limit the use of l-heuristics. Thereafter we ask about the kinds of environments in which heuristic approaches to lawmaking might flourish. In the final section we take a prescriptive stance and offer the Goddess (and the lawmaking community) some very tentative suggestions. In addressing this question we uncovered differences among ourselves as to whether the simple heuristics found in natural settings work for complex institutional arrangements. Because there are so many unanswered questions, our recommendations are posed as suggestions for potentially fruitful research.
IS THE MIND "PREPARED" FOR THE USE OF HEURISTICS?
Animals, even those with brains small enough to fit inside the head of an ant, manage to solve an extraordinary variety of adaptive problems, and every animal species other than our own manages to do so without the benefit of language, logic, or conscious verbal reasoning. Rats, for example, use a simple heuristic to help them figure out whether or not to eat a newly encountered food: try a new food if you smell it on the mouth of another rat, but not if you smell it on any other body part (Galef 1988) . This heuristic operates across species. It is not an attempt by individual rats to optimize their predictive powers, for even the smell of a new food on a dead rat's mouth is taken, wrongly, as a signal of food safety. Natural selection has produced many such mechanisms in animal minds that assemble a great variety of simple if-then rules for behavior. Animal minds are not blank slates, and mounting evidence suggests that human minds are not either (Cosmides and Tooby 2004) . Human minds, however, are different from those of other animals in two major ways. First, our long childhood and large, slowly developing frontal cortex means that we have a vastly expanded ability to learn new tricks, tips, and techniques for solving adaptive problems. Second, we do indeed have language, logic, and conscious reasoning. Humans, like rats, take their cues about palatability from their peers, yet few humans would fall into the trap of copying the food choices of a suddenly dead human. These two differences make a difference in the ways that humans learn and employ heuristics.
Many recent theorists in social and cognitive psychology have proposed that people have a "dual-processing" mental architecture (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Sloman 1996 ; for a critique of this view, see Gigerenzer and Regier 1996) . Most of what our minds do they do by using quick, automatic, heuristic-laden processing. Our visual system, for example, is able to achieve its miracles by massive use of heuristics, such as assuming that lines continue even when parts are occluded. This first cognitive system is sometimes called the automatic system, or intuitive system, or simply "system 1." But sometimes we really do think about a problem, consider counterfactual situations, entertain suppositions, weigh possibilities, and consciously decide upon a solution. This sort of thinking is slow, labored, and easily disrupted by other tasks; it is sometimes called the reasoning system, or controlled processing, or simply "system 2." Optimizing, in the unbounded rationality sense employed by many who invoke rational choice theory would deeply involve system 2 thinking. Yet there is nothing about system 2 thinking that precludes the conscious and deliberate use of heuristics. They are then colloquially referred to as rules of thumb. Empirically, people rely on them even in highly complex social settings, and often for good reason.
For our purposes, the most important point is that all people, regardless of education or intelligence level, are extremely good at using system 1 processes, whereas system 2 processes are much harder to master because they are more dependent on education, intelligence, and the opportunity to devote one's full attention to the task at hand. To the extent that laws and procedures only require people to rely on system 1 processes, they are asking people to do something that is cognitively easy. To the extent that laws and procedures require people to seek out more information and then weigh multiple outcomes (i.e., to rely on system 2 processing), they are asking people to do something that is more difficult, even if it is at times necessary.
The human mind, however, may not just be prepared to use heuristics; it may be prepared to use certain specific heuristics. There appears to be some similarity across cultures in the content of moral codes, at least at a high level of abstraction. One recent review (Haidt and Joseph 2004) suggests that these similarities result from the existence of four basic sets of intuitions involving: (a) suffering, harm, and violence; (b) reciprocity and fairness (including revenge); (c) hierarchy, duty, respect, and related intuitions about the social order and one's place in it; and (d) purity and related intuitions about chastity and piety. An intuition is an automatic evaluation that appears in consciousness, with no awareness of having gone through steps of reasoning or inference. One sees a social situation and instantly forms a judgment that something good or bad has happened. These intuitions are the foundations upon which a wide array of cultures construct their specific sets of virtues (e.g., cultures of honor build upon all four intuitions, while modern Western cultures make much less use of hierarchy and purity intuitions).
This perspective on morality has three implications for our report. First, an intuition is not by itself a heuristic, however many common moral heuristics are little more than injunctions to use one of the four sets of intuitions. For example, many of the behavioral instructions that parents give their children fall neatly into one of the four categories (e.g., "don't hit," "share and take turns," "respect your elders," and for teenage girls in many cultures "guard your purity").
Second, this perspective helps us understand many of the most daunting moral and legal quandaries, because intuitions often collide. Take, for example, the very modern issue of organ donation. Here our moral intuition to help others who are suffering conflicts with our sense of disgust. Our charitable self is frequently repulsed by the idea of bodily mutilation. Such opposing intuitions are common to many quandaries: abortion, the death penalty, cloning, or euthanasia. These quandaries are common when medical advances call old rules of human behavior into question.
Third, this perspective makes it clear that the law often serves as a constraint by imposing sanctions on behavior that is motivated, in part, by our evolutionary heritage. For example, a very large percentage of murders is committed by men who are acting on deep motivations for revenge (reciprocity), often related to feelings of tarnished honor (Fessler 2005; Nisbett and Cohen 1996) .
WHERE CAN HEURISTICS PLAY A ROLE IN LAWMAKING?
To understand the interaction between m-heuristics and l-heuristics, one needs a sense of how new law is being made, including a sense of how law is changed to be applicable to new sets of facts. In a rough way, one may distinguish two dimensions: one organizational and one procedural. In the organizational dimension, one specific arena for the generation of new law is characterized by the scope of its jurisdiction to prescribe; by those who hold lawmaking power; by (potentially) others who have access to the arena, ranging from a simple right to be heard to veto power; by the sources of law that may originate in the arena.
In the procedural dimension, the most common form to stylize facts is the so-called policy cycle. It starts with setting an issue on the agenda. In problem definition, the issue is given definite shape. Hereafter, one of usually many potential solutions is selected and enacted. It next must be implemented. Eventually, to close the cycle, the new rule is evaluated. If it does not perform to satisfaction, the cycle starts anew. Take ordinary legislation as an illustration. In most states, in this arena, the jurisdiction to prescribe is almost unlimited. Decision making is with Parliament, which often is organized in more than one chamber. Government has formal access, often together with further organs of the state. Indirectly, all actors have access if they possess veto power. The standard output of this lawmaking process is a statute. Competing or complementing arenas include the courts (for judge-made law), administrative agencies, up through civil society (for customary law, or as a more or less accepted actor in parliamentary proceedings). The resulting taxonomy helps avoid overgeneralization in the search for l-heuristics. It does not make sense to ask whether "the lawmaking process" or "the production of judge-made law" rely on heuristics. One may, however, investigate whether lawyers use heuristics when they select a case, write a brief, argue in court in front of a judge or in front of a jury. Likewise, one may ask whether politicians use heuristics when they set an agenda for new statutes, seek support in their political party for this agenda, argue in a parliamentary committee, draft a clause, seek expert support, talk to the media, or cast their vote on a bill.
Second, the taxonomy facilitates the understanding of how m-heuristics and l-heuristics interact. Consider, for instance, how the lawmaking process reacts to an exogenous shock. Suppose that a horrible automobile accident occurs in which a father and his two children burn to death. Further imagine that by coincidence, the accident was filmed in detail by a news camera crew. The news media repeatedly broadcast the vivid scene of the accident. Subsequent investigations reveal that although that model of automobile has a good safety record overall, it has suffered such fires before and that the fires could have been averted with an expensive design change. Investigations also reveal that the father negligently ran a red light, causing the accident. How will the legal system respond to an event with multiple causes, some individual and some structural?
First, one must ask how citizens will react. The ghastly scenes might invoke a range of anger toward the automobile manufacturer and desire to compensate the victims. The human mind-well suited to both outrage and empathy for such scenes-may be primed for such reactions. These reactions might well lead to behavior, such as writing to a member of the legislature or voting in a particular way, that builds on these system 1 reactions. Less accessible will be a system 2 analysis of whether the regulatory system is sensibly designed to maximize social utility. Suppose that the auto safety system at the time relies mostly on the tort system and consumer demand for auto safety, rather than regulation. In effect, what one will observe is a mismatch between the m-heuristics of the population in how to analyze this tragedy (which may well involve absolutist thinking, such as "safety at any price") and l-heuristics that the system has embraced (buyers should be careful as to what cars to drive, but can recover in tort for hidden defects which make the vehicle fail in ordinary use).
Public-interest organizations that promote automobile safety might well seize the opportunity to replay and reinforce these scenes as often as possible. Their efforts might be met by automobile manufacturers who introduce statistics about auto safety and the undesirability of embracing a complex regulatory solution to the perceived problem. Yet their efforts must overcome a mismatch between the cost-benefit approach these endorse and the intuitive sense of outrage and sympathy that most people will bring to the problem. The automakers might attempt, in turn, to focus attention on the negligent driver to refocus the outrage away from them. Generally, public interest groups will have the upper hand at this early stage of the policy cycle.
The reaction in the populace might then have altered the environment in which legislators operate. Public-spirited legislators, themselves relying on the natural grammar of outrage and sympathy, might come to believe that existing law offers insufficient protection to drivers and their families. Alternatively (and more cynically), legislators might simply worry that the failure to respond to the public outcry will risk the wrath of the voters. The legislators' own beliefs about the legal system might also interact with their concerns about voter wrath. They might worry that another accident at a critical moment in the electoral process might cost them their jobs, and therefore openly support stiffer regulatory measures.
The interaction between m-heuristics and l-heuristics might then recur in the courts. The accident is apt to influence the outcome of the inevitable lawsuit that the mother of the children would bring against the automobile manufacturer. Claims that the car's accident rate is statistically better than that of similar vehicles might prove unconvincing to a jury faced with a grieving mother and wife. These claims would not resonate well with the grammar of outrage and sympathy that humans seem well equipped to receive. Second, the manufacturer of this model of car might face strict liability for all future accidents of a similar sort-the car now having a reputation as dangerous. Third, the accident might lead the court to think about bending any rules that preclude damages to these identifiable victims. For example, the court might rethink rules that bar recovery for negligent plaintiffs.
The result in any case could be (and indeed in many jurisdictions is) the swift adoption of a regulatory regime, or a change in an existing regime in the rules that govern the definition of product defect, the proof of causation, and the role of plaintiff's misconduct. It may also consist of a vague clause in auto safety law (Stand der Technik or the best available technology) or of a new mandate to a regulatory agency ("automobiles must include all practicable safety precautions"). The agency will, in turn, begin to develop this standard into a set of workable, concrete standards to govern the automobile industry. Whether the agency staff is also influenced by the same grammar of outrage and sympathy is less clear. Their mandate requires them to hear expert evidence or even to commission systematic studies that could lead to a more dispassionate stance. Indeed, the agency might deliberately arrange its functions so as to minimize reliance on system 1 thinking. Accountability of the agency to other bodies (courts through judicial review, the legislature through the budgetary process) might also influence their preparedness to rely on l-heuristics.
Searching for general principles concerning the interaction between the human mind and the lawmaking process is thus perilous. One can see from the automobile example a nearly chaotic interaction between an exogenous event and the multilevel institutional response that it triggers. This interaction would not necessarily produce a predictable change in the underlying law. Several institutions (public-interest groups, the courts, administrative agencies) mediate the public reaction.
Nevertheless, one general principle that seems continuously at work is the power of narrative to move public opinion, incite a change in the judicial system, and foster legislative reform. Stories organize information in a way that is manageable to the human mind. They contain a limited number of keys and trigger a disregard of additional facts, yet they leave the impression that the whole problem is known and understood. At the same time, traditional legal theory resists their use on the ground that their disregard of facts often amounts to stereotyping and biased decisions.
The emphasis on context also suggests that the sketched taxonomy would even have to be further extended. How is arbitration or mediation different from or similar to adjudication in courts? Do they merit separate categories? What about other forms of private dispute resolution and lawmaking? Does education (being a lawyer, being a psychologist, …), cultural background (coming from the United States, from Germany…), gender, political affiliation, or belief in certain theories of justice impact on the use of heuristics and other modes of decision making? All of these questions await further research.
THE SPECIAL CASE OF JUDGE-MADE LAW IN THE COMMON-LAW TRADITION
The above scenario shows the creation of law through the interaction of multiple legal systems. In earlier systems of law, the administrative state often took a back seat to judge-made law, found in both the Roman and English law systems (see Epstein 1995) . Because it worked on a more limited canvas, judge-made law is usefully treated as a special category where heuristics could have a greater explanatory power. In these older systems, disputes tended to be dyadic, in sharp contrast to modern complex, multi-party litigation and complex administrative procedures. It seems appropriate to contrast the above discussion with an account of how heuristics operated in the relatively simple environments that might prove more congenial to simple rules of thumb. This exercise should not be merely considered a historical detour; much of the manner of thinking that arose in these simpler environments survives today. Classical legal systems, it can be argued, depended heavily on systems of classification to break down and organize legal experience. Categories of organization in the Roman and early English systems seem to map surprisingly well onto the four sets of moral intuitions discussed above. Thus intuitions or concerns about harm and suffering seem related to the system of delictual rules (an early cross between torts, private civil wrongs, and criminal law) and which may be a universal part of every legal system. The interests that these rules protected were largely the bodily integrity of the person and the physical inviolability of land and other forms of physical property. The second great category of legal obligations is that of contract or exchange, which matches up with intuitions related to reciprocity. The concept of exchange was so important that the general practice in both Roman and English systems is to deny the enforcement of gift promises while offering fairly extensive protection to exchange relationships, such as contracts of sale or hire. These regimes, it should be noted, do not involve a full commitment to a modern conception of freedom of contract, for it seems that many of the subsidiary terms of the agreement (e.g., on the allocation of risk of loss) were not easily waivable by the parties. Within that constraint, however, these arrangements were only rarely under the kind of legislative solutions (e.g., minimum wages, maximum prices) that abound in modern legal systems. These two bodies of law survive pretty much into their modern form today. There was also a complex law of persons, which deals with the position of slaves, children, and women, which seems to have engaged intuitions about hierarchy and status, most of which have given way in recent times. Finally, there were elaborate prohibitions, usually as part of the public law that regulated various sexual and religious practices. These regulations may have built upon moral intuitions about purity, disgust, and piety, which again are increasingly called into question today.
The ancient common-law courts largely lacked explicit notions of social utility maximization and might thus provide a marvelous arena in which to assess the interplay between m-heuristics and l-heuristics. Ancient systems might have thus focused more on how to resolve or prevent violent disputes that posed a direct threat to social order. Here are some of the kinds of heuristics that seemed to be at play in the system. First, the liability under the rules was not triggered unless there was some manifest form of physical injury, such as os fractum (a broken bone). With resources stretched thin, there was little desire to get involved with mental distress or various forms of soft-tissue injury of the sort that could not be diagnosed reliably in any event under the primitive technology of the time. The purpose of the rule, as it came to be explained by some later authors, was that it cut out of the legal system those cases that were difficult to observe and for which it was difficult to control fraud and abuse.
For those harms which passed the initial barrier, the next question was to set the rules for liability. Here again, theories of causation did not rest on abstract conceptions of "necessary" or "sufficient" conditions. The initial rule of liability was corpore corpori (by the body to the body) where the immediate physical connection tended to remove most doubts as to the origin and the deadliness of the harm in question. As with all subsequent systems, ultimately the rules of causation were not limited to these push/pull relationships but had to cover various cases of indirect harms, for which again early legal systems maintained tight legal connections. The Roman system did not develop a formal conception of "proximate causation," but it did stress the importance of the distinction between latent and patent defects. If the defendant dug a hole and covered it up with dirt and leaves, then he was liable to the party who, not seeing the peril, stepped into it. If, however, the hole were open to plain view, then the risk of loss remained on the plaintiff. In effect the older system used the latent/patent distinction as a proxy for asymmetrical information and imposed liability on a defendant only when he had created a peril (of which he had to know) of which the plaintiff was ignorant. The common-law rules reached this same result by holding that liability went with the last wrongdoer, so as once again to shorten the causal chains in question. Rules developed without reference to tests of utility often worked in practice to achieve just that end.
Some of these principles, having developed in a context in which they worked well, remain in force, despite a rise in the complexity associated with the modern state. Today, for example, the ancient rules governing latent and patent defects continue to rely on single factors to determine liability. These rules cut out a great deal of information that people might in practice think to be relevant to an overall decision as to who was at fault. Modern legal systems, starting in the late nineteenth century and gaining force from the middle of the twentieth century, have tended to change one half of the rule: the liability for the latent defect remains unchallenged but the rule of nonliability for patent defects has undergone a radical challenge. The newer approach holds that the obvious nature of the condition is relevant to the question of whether the defect is actionable but adopts instead a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis, often involving multiple factors to guide a jury in its deliberation as to whether this obvious defect should create liability. The use of this regime applies not only to holes in streets but also to dangerous equipment, such as saws and machine tools for which either an employer or a manufacturer could be held liable. The choice between these two regimes is a choice between a fast and frugal heuristic and a comprehensive social optimization rule. The former looks at one key fact on which liability turns, whereas the latter allows both sides to explain why some safety guard might have prevented the loss in question without causing undue inefficiency in the operation.
All these modern crosscurrents do not resolve the normative question of whether l-heuristics such as this should dominate across the full range of modern litigation. There are surely modern forms of liability under various environmental protection statutes that may not be amenable to these same techniques. Nonetheless, a simple l-heuristic that maps well onto prevailing m-heuristics might well remain useful. Take, for example, the notion that the common law of environmental regulation consisted of a simple rule of "live-and-let-live"; that is, you cannot sue your neighbor for annoying odors or smells and she cannot sue you for the same. One could argue that the rule makes sense from the point of view of a preindustrial society in which most people had the capacity to reciprocate in kind against such annoyances. The rule translates the m-heuristics associated with reciprocity into an easy-to-apply l-heuristic. We still possess many of the same m-heuristics, even now when they are sometimes ill-suited to the modern environment in which ordinary homeowners may find themselves living next to enormous factories. Reciprocity no longer accurately describes these interactions between neighbors so that the law must then adapt to the scale of the new technologies, even as it retains a sensible intuitive set of l-heuristics.
By the same token, it hardly follows that simple l-heuristics should be dismissed out of hand by courts who recognize that times have changed. After all, simple l-heuristics may have matched well with m-heuristics in a way that has many benefits for society at large. For example, the rule from the traditional nuisance law could operate as the clean-up target for environmental law, so that the huge costs of eliminating the last traces of pollution would be effectively eliminated. In addition, the environmental law could follow the common-law approach of strict liability that applies in ordinary nuisance cases so as to avoid complex determinations about the level of precautions taken by key actors: instead they proceed by looking solely at the harm caused.
This approach to liability cannot, of course, handle some kinds of environmental decisions. The issue of whether to purchase a public park or to clean up rivers and lakes from natural sources of pollution or pollution that arises from the combined activities of many small businesses does not appear to be subject to a simple heuristic, but rather invites a longer cost-benefit analysis where the emphasis is on efforts to see that the same number of dollars in two different sites reduces the expected harm from pollution by like amounts. These issues, however, draw us into a discussion of the administrative state and its approach to various social harms.
There is nothing that says that the simple heuristics which work well on a small canvas will operate as well on a large one, and some reason to believe that more overtly utilitarian calculations will have to guide the overall inquiry. Still, in addressing those issues of system-design, there may be a place for using these heuristics in setting up a clear and efficient enforcement mechanism that intermediates between the grand social plan as well as the individual target of regulation. Those issues shift the inquiry from judicial to legislative and administrative lawmaking to which we now turn.
WHAT ARE NORMATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF HEURISTICS IN LAWMAKING?
Even if it could be proven that in a certain context simple heuristics led to better outcomes than more complex deliberative procedures, there are a number of restrictions or constraints upon their use. Such constraints may arise out of fundamental legal values, they might stem from environmental factors, or they might be dependent upon particular psychological structures. Legal constraints may find their basis in legal theory, in constitutional or even international restrictions, or in statutory law or precedents. There are potential legal constraints on all levels of decision making, although there are fewer for members of civil society than for actors in the judicial, administrative/executive, and legislative arenas. The constraints also differ between the continental and the case law systems. The following illustrates the dimensions.
Constitutional Constraints
A number of constraints can be identified which are, in most Western legal systems, derived from constitutional laws, but may also be found in trans-or international legal systems. Constitutional constraints affect all levels of legal decision making, either directly or indirectly. For example, accountability is one fundamental way of legitimizing legal decisions which can be hostile to the use of heuristics. Holding the decision maker responsible for her decision follows from the regulative idea of a reasoned, deliberative decision-making process in which the decision maker evaluates alternatives. The regulative idea is violated if heuristics are employed. If this, however, becomes publicly known, the decision maker is easily exposed to public scrutiny. This may be more difficult if deliberative processes bring many aspects of a complex problem to light and thus may help hide the decision maker behind a veil of complexity. A fast and frugal decision may in this case create more accountability.
Other constitutional limitations on the use of heuristics include the constitutional right of equal treatment, rights of due process, retroactivity, separation of powers, limits on standing, or the right to judicial review of administrative acts.
Statutory or Precedent Law Limitations
Statutes or precedents may, like constitutions, make the use of heuristics doubtful in law-setting processes. Such laws find their application on several occasions of the official law-setting process, and even within agenda-setting as often establishing a social norm. One example, found in both the continental and American legal traditions, is the Anti-Age-and Anti-Gender-Discrimination laws that specify constitutional provisions. 2 Such rules create presumption against the use of such factors as race, gender, and, at least in the U.S. and in current E.U. law, against age in decisions. To the extent that heuristics rely on stereotypes about race, gender, or age, their use is plainly at variance with these statutory rules. However, heuristics with different cues may be a fast and frugal protective device against illegal discrimination.
Another good example of ordinary law-building barriers to the use of heuristics lies in procedural checks and balances (even if their violation does not entitle the defendant to appeal the case). In the German system, the rule of law principle (Rechtsstaatsprinzip) gives this constraint on the application of heuristics constitutional backing. Another example can be found in the practice of some independent agencies in the U.S., which provide for internal review of their administrative decisions before the case can be taken to court. As a review process can only function if a decision carries reasons, the existence of control procedures sends out messages to the primary decision makers to not employ heuristics for the actual decision making unless these can later be defended by rational arguments of the system 2 variety. Whether this eventually is beneficial is a different matter. As was stated in our brief review of relevant psychology, reasoning is often motivated and twisted to reach desired ends. Cost-benefit analyses can be tweaked to reach conclusions desired for other reasons, legitimate or illegitimate.
Other statutory-anchored constraints on the use of heuristics include rules of evidence in an adversarial litigation regime of law that require the possibility of counter-evidence. Courts and administrative bodies alike are also bound by a rule that requires hearing evidence from all interested parties. The use of heuristics can potentially violate these duties, as heuristics cut off most discussion and argumentation before the final decision.
Legal and Political Theory
Legal and political theory raise additional concerns about the application of heuristics. Public concern over an issue and public acceptance can both be a legitimizing force for a legal decision, yet these may be unacceptably neglected when a heuristic shortens the decision-making process in ways that preclude broadscale political "buy-in." These considerations may predominantly affect the legal actors in the law-setting process, but may also influence private actors when making their law-setting decisions whether to go to trial, or whether to make an effort in the agenda-setting process. Nevertheless, heuristics can also further public attention and acceptance in one of two ways: they can focus
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251 attention on a salient aspect of the problem or they can point the way to a common understanding of a complex problem.
General Concerns
Other general concerns that may counsel those making new law not to use heuristics include the amount of potential harm involved or the potential effects on general trust in law. Also, the stronger and more focused the interest of interested parties is, the less likely heuristics are applied. Another factor might be that heuristics use "cut-offs instead of trade-offs": They do not allow for a balancing of interests or an evaluation of different, competing goals. Heuristics, when used as a justification, do not respect the laws of reason and logic so fundamental for legal self-understanding. These many constraints-be they legally, psychologically, or morally motivated-deserve further consideration.
WHAT ENVIRONMENTS SUPPORT THE USE OF HEURISTICS?
Because environments matter, institutions matter. Institutional analysis and institutional design is the subject of many fields, from political science to organizational behavior. Most of this work embraces a rational choice perspective and it might be that the analysis of institutions is most sensibly accomplished through this lens. Some recent work, however, develops the role of heuristics in institutional settings (Langevoort, this volume). Herbert Simon, of course, was himself deeply interested in the study of institutions and found the concept of bounded rationality a tremendously valuable tool to study institutions (Simon 1947) . Institutional design influences the interaction of m-heuristics and lheuristics. Some designs might even foster optimization strategies sensibly. Determining whether the concept of heuristics provides helpful insights into institutions first requires a definition. In economics, institutions are broadly defined. In legal theory, institutions may be entities of actors and/or resources. We suggest that legal institutions can be helpfully defined as an arrangement of rules, routines, habits, and allocations of resources within which rules are generated as well as applied. Note that, for our purposes, the definition does not include the legal rules themselves. This definition highlights two areas of inquiry for the role of heuristics in legal institutions: (a) institutions operate as mediators between law and individual behavior; (b) legal institutions themselves can be and are adjusted in ways that affect individuals' thought processes.
First, the perspective on heuristics advanced in this chapter suggests that institutions mediate the interplay between law and behavior. Lawmakers can produce complex statutes that necessitate professional intermediation simply to explain the law to the regulatory targets. These are intermediaries of all kinds, both public and private, who translate legal rules so those who need them (not necessarily those to whom they are addressed, because the legislator may privilege one group to the detriment of another) can understand them. U.S. Government agencies often issue short explanations of the complex rulings that they propose on such matters as conflict of interest regulation for their employees. 3 Independent organizations such as the American Law Institute help convert messy or complicated areas of law into digestible concepts through their use of the Restatements of Law (which might be thought of as an example of the creation of l-heuristics). Note, however, that other organizations might better serve their own interests by making law more complicated and difficult to understand.
Second, much of law is explicitly about the design of lawmaking institutions. Many constitutional systems deliberately separate different governmental functions. Although a primary reason is to prevent the tyranny that might accompany the aggregation of power, this separation surely changes how people in the different branches of government think about the problems that they face (Rachlinski and Farina 2002) . As can be seen in the discussion on common-law courts, the interplay between m-heuristics and l-heuristics operates in a certain way in the courts. This interplay might be completely different in a legislative committee, or a decision-making body within an administrative state. If lawmaking requires the interplay between different organizations, this likely influences how people within those institutions think. For example, accountability might encourage transparency. Administrative agencies that have to explain their decisions to reviewing courts or legislatures might give brief and clear reasons for any decisions and never use a chart (or always use one), or use clear legal language (instead of the many languages the E.U. uses).
Division of labor is an important feature of the lawmaking processes. For example, in governments, different branches have to work together to produce government drafts. In parliaments, different committees have to somehow work together to prepare for a plenary decision on passing the statute. Compared to this, the broader division of powers between legislative, administrative, and judicial branches has a different effect, because this design is not necessarily governed by a need to reach consensus, but by the need to check and balance. In addition, different majority rules will change modes of decision making. It would be interesting to look at what kind of majority rule should be based on which heuristic to work well. (It may not be so clear what it means to "work well," since efficiency may be at odds with other considerations, as we discussed above.)
Another feature of institutional design in the legislative process is the position of political parties, as well as the role of government versus parliament, of citizens, NGOs, lobby groups, and of experts. For example, in the choice of experts, the heuristic used may be party affiliation or tendency to agree with party politics on broad issues ("he/she fits in," "hired guns"), rather than a decision based on an assessment of academic quality. The same can be observed in judicial proceedings: names may have to be published or not, academic records may be checked and made public or not, some other actor may have a say in the choice of experts or not, expert opinions may be excluded or limited to a very specific question or not, and some additional heuristics rules may govern the presence of experts, for example diversity in jury selection, or gender parity in German committee law (Bundesgremienbesetzungsgesetz, which requires government agencies to send male and female experts to certain committees).
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR RESEARCH
At this point we reveal the obvious: we are at a beginning, not an end. Like so many who have commissioned reports before, the Goddess of Justice is left with a rather long list of additional research that is needed. In this closing section we describe some questions and strategies that we think are particularly interesting.
Where to Look?
We suggest that the common law and judge-made law is likely to be a more fruitful venue for the study of both l-and m-heuristics. First, most of the literature on the efficacy and problems of heuristics is limited to the study of individuals. Understanding the m-heuristics used by judges is easier, given that the larger-scale units of administrative and legislative law involve complex sets of actors. Prior studies of heuristic use in small groups and of decision making in juries (Hastie and Wittenbrink, this volume; Pennington and Hastie 1990) suggest that these levels of analysis might also be most amenable to research efforts. One example of this research may be the use of moral intuitions in judicial decision making. Similarly, while the common law is by no means simple, we think an understanding of where l-heuristics have emerged and their efficacy is very important. For example, simplified procedures such as a statutes of limitations are lheuristics, in contrast to, say, a rule that said that the amount won in a civil suit would be discounted over time. We suspect that this l-heuristic produces reductions of complexity and uncertainty in ways that more than justify the reduction in accuracy.
For What Do We Look?
Simplicity, however, comes at a potential cost. By definition, heuristics ignore some potentially relevant information. The magic of heuristics is performed by exploiting the environment (e.g., the nature of redundancy in information). This suggests two limits. The first is that dynamic environments, subject to rapid changes in the nature of information, may be particularly dangerous places for the use of heuristics. As observed by Payne et al. (1993) , an adaptive decision maker must have a repertoire of heuristics and knowledge of when to use them. Single rule use may, indeed, be maladaptive. The second occurs when the environment is controlled by a potentially hostile opponent. If an opponent knows the heuristic in use, he might alter the environment so that this heuristic will do badly. For example, the effort savings of the Take The Best heuristic could be exploited by an environment in which the weights attached to variables are equal. Similarly if the opponent is playing a heuristic strategy, the assumption of complete and mutual rationality can in fact lead to outcomes that are inferior to one generated by an algorithm that provided the best response to the heuristic. This raises the important question of how complex is the repertoire of legal decision strategies, and how they might adapt to competitive, and adversarial environments.
These observations are particularly relevant given our distinction between land m-heuristics. Unlike m-heuristics that can be selected by the decision maker as environments change, l-heuristics are typically applied consistently because they are part of the law or legal procedure. While heuristics have the advantage of increasing transparency, they also have the disadvantage of potentially being exploited and resulting in unintended consequences.
What Wins? Complexifying versus Bounded Rationality
In contrast to our appeal to simplicity, we suspect that complexifying is a common response to attempts to introduce heuristics. While heuristics may increase transparency, that may not be in the interest of all parties involved. Complexifying procedures are often used to reduce transparency. Many parties with vested interests do not support transparency, and would benefit from the abandonment of l-heuristics.
How to Communicate?
Our perspective suggests that heuristics that fit with our basic moral intuitions are more likely to be adopted and respected. The new field of cultural epidemiology (e.g., Boyer 2001; Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004) looks at how ideas and innovations spread through a culture. Just as the spread of a pathogen depends on the physiological and behavioral properties of its host, the spread of an idea depends on the cognitive properties of the (host) minds it inhabits. If the (enculturated) human mind is prepared to care about (some subset of) harm, fairness, hierarchy, and purity, then l-heuristics that mesh with those minds will feel good, right, and just. They will be easily understood and readily transmitted. They will be infectious, inhabiting many minds in the population in a stable way.
In contrast, l-heuristics that violate intuitive ethics will feel strange and are more likely to generate resistance and resentment.
An important research area is therefore the use of heuristics for communication. Much as people have thought of brand recognition as a simplified way of making product choices, or of political parties as simplified ways of choosing candidates, we suspect that the simple names given complex laws and regulations may in fact be named in a way to tap moral intuitions. Casual observations are abundant: Legislative acts in the U.S. are often named so as to push people's intuitive ethical buttons. For example, how could any American oppose "The Patriot Act," which reduces civil liberties to combat terrorism? Or how could anyone be so coldhearted as to oppose "Megan's Law," named after a young female victim of a released sex offender, which specifies a complex set of procedures for notifying residents of the presence in their neighborhoods of former sex offenders. A model for such research might be Heath et al.'s (2001) studies of folk beliefs and urban legends.
CONCLUSION
We have suggested that, in general, when l-heuristics match up with mheuristics, a variety of benefits are likely. However not all such matches will be beneficial. After all, minds designed for the small-group living conditions of hunter-gatherers are now operating in advanced market economies and nation states. Policies that seem just and reasonable to such minds may have disastrous consequences because our minds are not equipped to compute the emergent properties of interactions among millions of people over long periods of time. Determining whether any of our proposed research would generate worthwhile interventions requires understanding complex social welfare consequences. Clearly this requires scientific research, mathematical analysis, and debate; that is, a great deal of system 2 reasoning by a population of specialists. These specialists may, in the end, produce policies that rely on heuristics, but they need to think about unintended consequences and other factors which emerge when heuristics are applied in a domain as dynamic and adversarial as the making of the law. There are reasons to be cautious in using heuristics in lawmaking, but there are reasons to be optimistic as well. We recommend that the Goddess should keep reading, and stay tuned for further findings in the coming years.
